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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

24 August 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL KING

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Record (Attached)

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Whelan, 19 August 1954

1. The actions in reference memo have all been taken. [] and [] have combined in rough draft the findings of our cable files and the cable reply received from [] specifically to my query. [] has been asked to come up and will be here the 28th. [] has been asked to look after him.

2. After reading the [] paper, I do not conclude that we are morally bound by any specific commitments to [] and moreover I do not follow [] arguments in this direction. Perhaps a talk with him will reveal what more passed than seems to be reflected in the cables if we read them clearly.

3. I have therefore advised Ray Luddy that I do not find anything to convince me that we are specifically bound and have told him that you will contact him on August 30 in order to carry on this conversation with him and Whelan. My guess is that it is probably to our advantage not to stir this one up. The Department is standing firm on [] and I think it would be to our real disadvantage could it be said that anything we had done has weakened this country's ability to stand on the line now being taken by []

[]

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MEMORANDUM FOR: []

SUBJECT : SKIMMER [] Aircraft Negotiations

1. The original understanding between SKIMMER [] as to disposition of the fighter aircraft at the conclusion of PBSUCCESS was that [] would receive the three F-47s which had been purchased by SKIMMER through [] who acted as a front man. On 4 July Headquarters in DIR 07778 to Lincoln stated that "SYNCARP recognizes obligation to leave [] with three operational F-4 7s or equivalent" and went on to state that [] might be encouraged to procure P-51s rather than keep the F-47s (which would then be given to CALLIGERIS). This view was sent to [] in LINC 4689 which stated that "SKIMMER will use its maximum influence to help [] procure additional fighter aircraft overtly from ODYOKE." However, on 9 July DIR 08329 instructed Lincoln to "advise [] re his request for (seven) P-51s that cover ^{most difficult} acquisition... Suggest to [] that if he really needs P-51s best to make overt approach. Then observe to [] your personal opinion that there are entirely too many rumors as to [] intended move against LCPANGS to make it likely that he will be given aircraft." This information was sent to [] in LINC 4736 which stated that the station's position should be that: while [] approach for purchase of aircraft would be supported to maximum extent possible by SKIMMER, however, as a personal opinion it should be pointed out that [] ~~might~~ might be unable to obtain sale of aircraft since there were many rumors that PBPRIME was worried about his intended move against LCPANGS and if ~~they~~ true, SKIMMER could do nothing about a PBPRIME refusal to sell aircraft to him.

2. Until 17 July the situation remained as above with [] unwilling to release the F-47s still in his possession to CALLIGERIS until he was assured of obtaining P-51s to replace them. ~~However, by that time he had upped the ante and was interested in not only replacing the F-47s on hand, but of getting a total of seven P-51s for which he would pay cash.~~ By 10 August he was trying to negotiate the purchase

XXXXX

of twenty-five P-51s [] and asked SKIMMER to persuade the [] Ambassador in Washington that he should advise his government to permit the sale.

3. [] stated on 21 August that SKIMMER's moral obligation ^{at least} to assist [] in acquiring/some of the P-51s he was attempting to purchase stems from promises made to [] in the following LINC cables:

4673

4689

4729

4736

It would appear from an analysis of these particular cables that the first three were very encouraging to [] in pledging "all possible assistance" by SKIMMER, but that the last cable was a complete reversal insofar as SKIMMER's views on the possibility of obtaining aircraft was concerned. This change was based on the known fact of ODYOKE concern ^{over} the KMFLUSH-LCPANGS situation, which SKIMMER would have no ability to alter. In this connection, it is suggested that DIR 08329 and LINC 4736 be analysed further to see whether there is any any important alteration in the spirit of DIR 08329 as it was relayed to [] in LINC 4736.

4. It is the writer's opinion that [] was given ^{firm} ~~with~~ warning on 9 July in LINC 4736 that any attempt to purchase aircraft might be jeopardized by ~~ODYOKE~~ ODYOKE fears as to his intentions toward LCPANGS. It is also apparent that up until that moment ~~he~~ he was given ~~no~~ reason to doubt that SKIMMER was entirely convinced ~~XXXX~~ he would be able to get the P-51 aircraft he desired merely by making formal application through normal channels.

5. Attached for your information ~~ix~~ are sections from pertinent cables concerning this matter.

[]

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①

LINC 4562 to SHER
~~(State)~~
30 June 54

1. Air craft involved in FBSUCCESS were:
 - a. 3 C-47's
 - b. 6 F-47's
 - c. 1 P-38
 - d. 1 Cessna 180
 - e. 1 Cessna 140
2. Losses have been 2 F-47's, one at Somerset crash landing plus mishandling [] and other battle casualty crashed at Chiquimula.
3. Three of six F-47's were purchased from [] with understanding should be returned to him when no longer needed. Same true of P-38.
4. Other F-47's and Cessna 140 purchased by SYNCARP.
5. Cessna 180 taken by SYNCARP following change Delgado title with understanding should be given [] when no longer needed.
6. Three C-47's only loaned to project and no obligations re other disposition involved.
7. Recommend: Three F-47's and one CAT C-47 turned over to []. P-38, F-47, and Cessna 180 turned over to [] with assurance more F-47's or equivalent will be delivered by SYNCARP. Give Cessna 140 to [] Return other two C-47's to original owners.
8. Please send comments.
9. If agree, authority hereby given to complete all arrangements as soon as LINC advises no longer any need hold in reserve.

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(2)

SHER 526 to LINC

~~(date)~~

2 July 54

1. Original agreement with [] as follows: SYNCARP buy, through [] three F-47's. Two F-47's to be given [] in return for his support and one F-47 in exchange for P-38.
2. [] feels P-38 blown and does not want it. He would like the following agreement:
 - a. SYNCARP give CALLIGERIS the ~~four~~ four F-47's plus spare parts ~~for STORAX~~ and replace F-47's with three P-51's plus spare parts for [] or,
 - b. Give CALLIGERIS three F-47's and [] keep one F-47. SYNCARP to send ~~two~~ F-47's to SOMERSET ~~making~~ total three. [] keep F-47 spare parts.
3. No F-47's leave SOMERSET until replacement aircraft A or B arrive.
-
6. [] further requests that SYNCARP assist him in obtaining ODYOKE approval for him to purchase from ODYOKE seven additional F-51's and adequate spare parts and maintenance equipment.
.....
8. [] does not want under any conditions two difference types fighters. He can only train pilots and maintain one type

4638

LINC ~~to~~ to SHER

~~(date)~~

2 July 54

1. Turn over three operational F-47's plus wrecked F-47 to []
2. Remaining F-47 must be returned to FJHOPEFUL soonest.
3. Turn over P-38 to [] condition he give it to [] on behalf of CALLIGERIS immediately.
4. Turn over to CALLIGERIS C-47 he now using.
- ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

SHER 536 to LINC

~~(date)~~

3 July 54

[] does not want shot up F-47's left with him nor P-38 which bombed the British ship.

* LINC 4673 to SHER 1. Following represents firm position of Hqs on entire subject A/C:

~~(date)~~

3 July 54

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
(TYPIST - Please insert material on last page entitled "INSERT")

~~SHER 548 to LINC~~

~~STORAX is agreeable to proposal re F-47's in LINC 4673~~

SHER 546 to LINC

~~(date)~~ 4 July 54

...4. We are obligated to give [] 3 operational F-47's. Can we tell [] that SYNCARP will give him one more F-47 when CALLIGERIS picks up his two?

LINC 4676 to SHER

4 July 54

...4. Para 4 ref (SHER 546) assure [] that when and if CALLIGERIS picks up two F-47's SKIMMER will meet its obligations by providing additional F-47. View of situation on F-47 spares etc our recommendation to [] would be for him to concentrate on getting P-51's through normal ODYOKE channels who would be receptive to such an approach

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SHER 548 to LINC

~~(memo)~~

4 July 54

[] is agreeable to proposal re F-47's (LINC 4673). He would release P-28 as soon as CALLIGERIS settled in Guatemala City; and one F-47 after all danger of overthrow is past. [] wants a (the) third F-47, but he would prefer P-51 if he can get all P-51's. [] would like SYNCARP's political help in buying additional fighter aircraft from ODACID.

DIR 07778 to LINC

4 July 54

Recommended reply to SHER 548 as follows:

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ (written
by Bissell after
consulting with
Holland)

- a. SYNCARP recognizes obligation to leave [] with three operational F-47's or equivalent.
- b. If satisfactory to CALLIGERIS, we will settle for disposition of three operational F-47's to [] to CALLIGERIS. These aircraft must be immediately operational.
- c. SYNCARP will give maximum help to [] in procuring additional fighter aircraft overtly from PBPRIME.
- d. Advise [] that F-47's are scarce and spares are even more scarce, and that it may be wiser for him to procure P-51's than to keep F-47's.

LINC 4688 to SHER

5 July 54

...ideal solution to aircraft problem may be for [] to procure P-51's from ~~OD~~ PBPRIME and sell F-47's and spares to CALLIGERIS.

* LINC 4689 to []

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ 5 July 54

procure additional fighter A/C overtly from ODYOKE. Encourage him to switch to P-51's and dispose of his F-47's by sale to CALLIGERIS as latter A/C now

1. [] to LINC
2. [] also desires SKIMMER assist him in acquiring seven P-51's with spare parts soonest either overtly or covertly. He will pay for these and make own arrangement to sell remaining F-47's with spare parts to CALLIGERIS. However, he does not desire to sell F-47's until he had received P-51's to replace them.

8 July 54

3. Advise procedure [] should follow to acquire P-51's.

* LINC 4729 to ~~SHER~~

9 July 54

Re [] approach to ODYOKE for P-51's should be through ~~AM~~ LUSH ambassador to ODACID just as procurement of F-47's was handled. Previous assurances of maximum SKIMMER support to [] request for P-51's should make it obvious that such a request will receive expeditious and almost certain favorable consideration.

scarce ~~parts~~ and parts almost unobtainable.

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LINC 4731 to DIR
9 July 54

1. LINC strongly concurs with [] desires for P-51's and subsequent sale F-47's to CALLIGERIS and urges all possible KUBARK effort to insure favorable decision on KMFLUSH request to ODACID and expeditious delivery of aircraft.

2. As expansion of above views, following submitted for your consideration:

- a. Personal relations with [] and KMFLUSH support of PBSUCCESS have emphatically pointed up [] opposition to Communism,
- b. SKIMMER as authorized by Hqs has made definite commitments to both [] and CALLIGERIS re help on air support which while no officially ODYOKE commitments must be morally recognized as such and fulfilled if any future ODYOKE-Latin American dealings are to have proper foundations.

DIR 08329 to LINC
9 July 54

[]

1. Advise [] re his request for P-51's that covert acquisition most difficult to repeat in view questions being asked at this time about "covert" acquisition P-47's, but that you will look into matter in spirit of ~~prior~~ previous understanding. FYI: No action will be taken by KUBARK to acquire.

2. Suggest to [] that if he really needs P-51's ~~the~~ best to make overt approach. Then observe to [] your personal opinion that there are entirely too many rumors as to [] intended move against LCPANGS to make it likely he will be given aircraft.

* LINC 4736 to []
9 July 54

1. Supplementing para 3 ref (LINC 4729) your position with [] should be:

- a. [] approach for purchase aircraft will be supported to maximum extent possible by SKIMMER
- b. You should however, give as personal opinion that [] may be unable obtain sale aircraft since many rumors that PBPRIME worried about [] intended move against LCPANGS.
- c. You should point out that if true PBPRIME refusal to sell is something about which SKIMMER can do nothing.

2. FYI: Same point will be made to KMFLUSH ambassador by ODACID important therefore your position include above personal opinion to avoid any possible inference that [] will obtain aircraft when he may not.

[] to DIR
17 July 54

[] applying immediately through his ambassador for seven P-51's on ~~receipt~~ receipt of airplanes or definite assurance from ODACID that he can purchase them he will release F-47's to CALLIGERIS.

~~DIR 10074~~

[] to DIR
10 August 54

1. [] negotiating [] for purchase of 25 P-51's together

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(5)

with sufficient spare parts for 500 hours and necessary special tools for maintenance. Purchase price including transportation to Nicaragua \$600,000. [] requests SKIMMER assist in convincing [] ambassador in Washington to advise his government to permit sale. [] aware that present tension with LCPANGS responsible for attitude of [] government and promises planes will not be used for aggressive purposes.

2. [] . leaving soon [] to attempt to close sale and arrange transportation of planes.

3. If possible MAGOFFIN believes SKIMMER should give assist to [] for following reasons:

- a. [] has yet to violate his word once given.
- b. Due to generally assumed relationship between [] and CALLIGERIS, presence of planes in KMFLUSH could be strong deterrent to any attempt to overthrow CALLIGERIS.
- c. MAGOFFIN believes SKIMMER has moral obligation to give [] assistance in acquiring some planes although not this number in view of promises made before closing out PBSUCCESS

DIR 12970 to []
13 August 54

1. FYI: only ODACID feels that because of current tensions in area and truculent attitude of [] we should give no positive assist toward his acquisition of material which would undoubtedly be utilized as a threat against LCPANGS.

2. In light of the foregoing policy best available SKIMMER reply is

- a. SKIMMER disposes of no appropriate possibility intervention [] ambassador Washington
- b. In view, however, SKIMMER's esteem and regard for [] it will, ~~withought~~ without much hope of success, look into matter.

FYI only it is most unlikely that SKIMMER can in foreseeable future affect pious expression above para 2b

4.(sic) Ref ~~XXXX~~ [] para c request you pouch review of "promises" including your appreciation of problem you face and any recommendations you ~~have~~ may have. This connection know you understand that SKIMMER [] friendship is an asset KUBARK desires preerve insofar reasonably possible.

DIR 13957 to []
19 August 54

1. In meeting ODACID/KUBARK, your ambassador referred to ref [] 1121) para 4 "promises and recommended that something be done to assist []". Although ODACID policy remains firm against increase [] air power at this time, it was agreed review matter in light ref para 4X as pect.....

[] 1126 to DIR
21 August 54

1. Ref B?C,D,E contain Hqs and LINC instruction re future acquisition

~~SECRET~~

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of planes b [] . Ref D (LINC 4729) is promise made by MAGOFFIN to [] not angry nor belligerent over failure of SKIMMER to produce as he realizes reason: However, he is hurt that he has been shown no more consideration than he had been given him in view of aid he rendered.

2. Hqs conference believed by MAGOFFIN most desirable as it will convince [] SKIMMER still interested in him even if nothing more accomplished. Also of value to review entire PBSUCCESS and KMFLUSH -LCPANGS relationships.

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INSERT

~~XX~~

~~XX~~

...4. These objectives best served by following specific steps:

- a. two operational F-47s plus wrecked F-47 should remain
C J possession. These would be planes with least evidence
battle damage.
- b. other two operational F-47s should be held for probably
later delivery to CALLIGERIS
- c. pending such delivery, CALLIGERIS
- d. C J should be assured that if at later date he wishes
sell his F-47s and replace with P-51s he will be able to
do so.

~~SECRET~~

MEMO FOR RECORD

25 August 1954

SUBJECT: [] SKIMMER Aircraft Negotiations

The ~~draft~~ ^{*}paper on this subject recapitulating the traffic ~~was~~ was submitted in rough draft form ^{*}to [] on 24 August by [] He in turn used the paper as an attachment to a memo directed to J.G. King dictated on 24 August.

[]

* There is no other copy of said "paper" except the "rough draft" which [] gave to []

[]

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[] 1126 dated 21 August is latest cable on this matter